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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Jurisdidion
An original ,habeas corpus proceeding in the court of appeals' chal-
lenged -the authority of the Ohio State Penitentiary warden to continue
the petitioner's imprisonment. The petitioner who had been indicted
for, convicted of, and sentenced for, armed robbery had been transferred
from Columbus to the Lima State Hospital from which he had escaped
and fled to Tennessee. Since the prisoner had been returned to Ohio
without the formality of extradition, he charged that this fact made his
detention in the Ohio penitentiary unlawful. The court denied the writ,
relying upon a prior similar decision and a lower court holding that an
unauthorized return to Ohio could not be shown to vitiate an original
prosecution and conviction 2
The Ohio Code3 authorizes a trial court in which a plea of not guilty
by Teason of insanity has been filed -to commit the defendant to a mental
hospital to remain under observation for a period not to exceed one
month. A defendant who had filed such a plea sought release from the
Toledo State Hospital on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional
and also that the trial court was without jurisdiction because the accused
had been twice ordered committed by the court of probate and had
on one occasion 'been found mentally ill. The writ was discharged by the
court of appeals, and affirmed 'by the Supreme Court; 4 -both holding that
the trial court dearly had statutory jurisdiction and further that the statute
is valid.
1. Wood v. Alvis, 149 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
2. The similar escapee-return situation was the subject of the decision in Wise v.
State, 96 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). That decision in turn relied very
heavily upon Ex parte James Camp, 7 Ohio N.P. 614, 8 Ohio Dec. 681 (Ohio C. P.
1896), involving the refusal to grant a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus to a
person returned to Ohio under an irregular executive warrant for extradition and
thereupon prosecuted and convicted of a felony. The court declared that there is no
right of asylum as between the states for the benefit of a fugitive from justice. The
opinion suggested that the holding would have been the same had the return to
Ohio been by means of kidnapping.
3. OHIO REv. CoDn § 2945A0.
4. In re Fisher, 167 Ohio St. 296, 148 N.E.2d 227 (1958). The court's opinion
carefully distinguishes its former holding in State ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong, 159
Ohio St. 259, 111 N.E.2d 918 (1953), in which it affirmed a discharge from cus-
tody under a writ of habeas corpus when the trial court had summarily ordered com-
mitment to the Lima State Hospital on suggestion of the prosecutor and against the
strong objection of the defendant who had filed a plea of not guilty. In that case
the court indicated the general validity of the statute but held that its specific ap-
plication under the circumstances was a denial of due process of law.
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Juvenile Jurisdiction
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga
County found a minor to be delinquent, placed him on probation, and
attempted to regulate his social contacts. On appeal, counsel for the
delinquent contended that the decision was against the weight of the evi-
dence, that inadmissible evidence had -been received and that the consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination had been infringed. The court of
appeals, in affirming determined that a juvenile delinquency proceeding
is not a criminal trial, and that the rules of civil procedure apply as nearly
as possible - including the preponderance of the evidence rule. Since
the proceeding 'is civil in nature, there is no violation of the provisions
against self-incrimination because the testimony would not involve him
in a criminal prosecution or relate to one.'
Other decisions applied the statutes relating to juvenile jurisdiction
to adults. One statute prohibits conduct by adults, who "act in a way
tending to cause delinquency in such child."6  The parents of a 16-year-
old girl actively participated in a plan to -achieve her marriage by trans-
porting her to another state and consenting to the marriage there. They
were convicted of acting in a way tending to cause delinquency.7 The
Supreme Court indicated that the prosecution did not have to show an
actual delinquency, only that the consenting to an under-age marriage
would tend to cause the minor to commit an act of delinquency, e.g.,
truancy from home or school.8 Unlike the child charged with delinquency
in the juvenile court, the adult being tried by that court is entitled to
the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.9 The basic sta-
tute'0 on this subject is fully applicable, including the privilege of the
prosecutor to comment on the defendant's decision not to take the stand.
The Supreme Court, in affirming a decision of the court of appeals,"
held that the state in prosecuting an adult for "participation" in the
5. State v. Shardell, 153 N.E.2d 510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). Since the trial judge
struck the hearsay evidence from the record, there was no error and the judge had
the training and experience to disregard incompetent evidence in the record when
considering the merits.
6. OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.41.
7. State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 70 9 (1958).
8. OHIo REv. CODE § 2151.02 (C), (D).
9. State v. Parks, 105 Ohio App. 208, 152 N.E.2d 154 (1957).
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.43.
11. State v. Miclau, 104 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 596 (1957), Aff'd, 167
Ohio St. 38, 146 N.E.2d 293 (1957); See Comment, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957,
9 WEST. REs. L. REv. 303-04 (1958).
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"delinquency of a minor" must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was some delinquency of the minor.'
2
State v. Meadows13 presented a familiar problem of statutory defini-
tion of crimes: Does the "cutting and/or stabbing"'14 statute define only
one crime with respect to a single series of acts or a single transaction?
Meadows was indicted, tried and convicted on two counts: cutting and/or
stabbing with intent to wound and cutting and/or stabbing with intent
to kill. The conviction of the two separate offenses was sustained
though both offenses are defined in the single statute.
An Ohio statute' 5 requires anyone drilling or digging wells for hire
to keep an accurate and careful "log" of each operation and file a copy
with the State Division of Water. The defendant failed -to file logs for
a number of wells which he had drilled and he was prosecuted under the
'criminal .penalty provisions of this state. The trial court held the statute
unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) arbitrary classification; (2) the
taking of valuable property without compensation and without due
process of law in violation of the Constitutions of Ohio and the United
States. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals' 6 whose de-
cision was affirmed 'by the Supreme Court.' The higher courts found
that the statute makes a reasonable classification in distinguishing be-
tween well diggers or drillers for hire and all others and treat all persons
in the "for hire" category equally. They further held that it is a rea-
sonable exercise of the state's police power relative to the conservation
of the water resources of the state.
Motor Vehicles and Traffic
Three decisions related to separate problems under the traffic laws.
In one case the defendant was operating a trailer 'bearing Illinois license
plates in the distribution of interstate shipments in the Cleveland area.
This trailer was based in Cleveland and used for hauling from the main
12. State v. Miclau, 167 Ohio St. 38, 146 N.B.2d 293 (1957). Three members
of the Supreme Court dissented from the decision of the court. Their position was
essentially that an act of delinquency was in fact committed by the minor under the
facts even though what she did was done at the request of the law enforcement offi-
cers and further that the decision of the majority was inconsistent with the legisla-
tive policy expressed in the statutes relating to juveniles.
Also the practical indirect affect of this decision is to permit a greatly liberalized
conception of the defense of entrapment, as applied to acts in relation to a juvenile.
13. 105 Ohio App. 86, 148 N.E.2d 345 (1957).
14. Omo Ruv. CoDE § 2901.23.
15. OHiO REv. CODE § 1521.05.
16. State v. Martin, 105 Ohio App. 469, 152 N.B.2d 898 (1957).
17. State v. Martin, 168 Ohio St. 37, 151 N.E.2d 7 (1958).
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terminal in Cleveland to outlying Ohio destinations. The court of appeals
held the exemption and reciprocal provisions of the Code' 8 inapplicable
to this defendant since the Illinois "licensed" trailer was not properly
licensed in Illinois.19
A construction of the "stop sign" statute2 grew out of a prosecution
-for "traffic" manslaughter in which the trial court sustained defendant's
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case, and the state ap-
pealed on questions of law. The court of appeals held2 ' that the statute
is not a -right-of-way statute and that a violation of it begun by a failure
to stop and yield the right of way is a continuing one as the violator
continues through the intersection. Thus when the violator drives into
the through street without stopping and strikes another vehicle which in
turn strikes and kills a pedestrian, it is a jury question to determine
whether the violation which has continued to the point of impact with
the other car is a proximate cause of the death of the pedestrian.
Finally, a Supreme Court decision provides further clarification of
the meaning of an "emergency vehicle," which is authorized by statute
to ignore traffic control signals under stated conditions. The statutory
definition extends to motor vehicles used by volunteer fireman respond-
ing to emergency calls in the fire department service. A volunteer fire-
man, observing all of the requirements of the statute, ignored a city
traffic signal while driving to a place of assembly in response to a
summons for emergency fire department service. He was arrested by
city police and was convicted. Judgment was reversed by the court of
appeals. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision
and held that the definition of an emergency vehicle includes one ope-
rated by a volunteer fireman traveling in a properly identified vehicle
to a designated assembly point from which emergency fire department
service is to begin.23
18. OHIO REV. CODE § 4503.36.
19. City of Cleveland v. Ryan, 106 Ohio App. 110, 148 N.E.2d 691 (1958). An-
other contention of the defendant was that another driver for the same interstate
trucking line had been arrested under similar circumstances and had been found
not guilty. This amounted to a construction of the statute, he thought, binding upon
the court in similar cases. In rejecting this contention the court's opinion asserted
that the principle of stare decisis is not to be followed blindly particularly in crimi-
nal cases where justice requires otherwise. The court's opinion also contains a very
startling statement: "The principle of res judicata has no application to the criminal
law." The context indicates that it intended by this to assert merely that each crimi-
nal prosecution is a separate and distinct case from every other prosecution.
20. OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.43.
21. State v. Knadler, 105 Ohio App. 135, 151 N.E.2d 763 (1957).
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.01(D).
23. City of Canton v. Snyder, 168 Ohio St. 69, 151 N.E.2d 15 (1958).
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Forgery
The Ohio offense 24 of forgery includes the uttering of a check as
a false instrument, knowing it to be false, with the intent to defraud.
In a case arising under this offense the defendant signed a check as the
maker with his own name upon a drawee bank with which he had no
account. He was convicted in the trial court on a plea of guilty to the
crime of forgery. The court of appeals 25 took the position that forgery
includes only the signing of a name other than that of the signer. The
case was certified because of a conflictO6 with the point of view of an-
other court of appeals, and the Supreme Court27 held that the act in
question constituted forgery within the terms of the Ohio statute;
i.e., signing his own name to a check drawn on a bank with which he
had no account constituted the false making of a check within the mean-
ing of the statute.
Habitual Criminal
In State ex rel. Daley v. Myers,28 the accused, who had been sentenced
to the workhouse three times previously following convictions for intoxi-
cation, was convictd a fourth time. The trial court sentenced him under
the so-called "habitual offender" statute.29 The accused asserted that the
statute, providing for a sentence of one to three years for the fourth
offense, was unconstitutional because it failed to differentiate between
offenses which did and did not involve moral turpitude.P The argument
was rejected because there was no "moral turpitude" requirement in the
section under which this sentence was imposed; its only requirements be-
24. OHIO R1Ev. CODE 5 2913.01.
25. The court of appeals relied on its prior decision in State ex rel Bailey v. Hen-
derson, 76 Ohio App. 547, 63 N.E.2d 830 (1945).
26. In State v. Havens, 91 Ohio App. 578, 109 NXE.2d 48 (1951), the opinion
indicates that the Ohio offense of forgery goes beyond the common law conception
of forgery as the alteration of another's signature.
27. Io re Clemons, 168 Ohio St. 83, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958).
28. 153 N.E.2d 531 (Ohio Cr. App. 1958).
29. OHIO REv. CODE § 753.07.
30. Under the better known "cumulative sentence" sections of the Criminal Code
(OHIo REV. CODE: § 2949.33-.34) an identical sentence may be imposed on the
4th conviction for a misdemeanor, but here the prior misdemeanors must involve
moral turpitude on each occasion. At least one court has held that conviction of
intoxication does not involve moral turpitude within the meaning of this section.
State v. Deer, 129 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio C. P. 1955).
The statute under which Daley was imprisoned in the principal case does not
mention moral turpitude. Its emphasis is on three previous workhouse sentences
for violation of Ohio criminal statutes or municipal ordinances.
19591
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW 
ing "three times convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in any workhouse
for violation of law or ordinance."
Blue Law
The "Ohio Sunday dosing" statutesl has been under attack in the
court of appeals in recent years 32 A series of current court of appeals
decisions sustained its validity. These cases were consolidated for argu-
ment before the Ohio Supreme Court, and the validity of the statute was
upheld.83 The Court considered this statute a valid police power statute
which is neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable, nor is it a statute
for the enforcement or promulgation of religious observances. It seems
the exception made in the statute for "work of necessity or charity" is
not an unreasonable classification.
Public Safety and Morals
Lower court decisions have sustained prosecutions for violations of
police power legislation enacted in the interest of public safety and morals.
In State v. Rothschida4 a conviction was sustained under the statute 5
which prohibits the exhibition of motion pictures which teach or advocate
the violation of any criminal laws of the state. A municipal court con-
viction for the violation of a city ordinance which prohibited the sale of
obscene publications or pictures was affirmed in City of Cincinnati v.
King.3 6
Testimonial Immunity
The Ohio Supreme Court3 7 upheld convictions of witnesses who re-
fused to testify before the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission
during 1952, relying upon the "Fifth" Amendment. These prosecutions
were brought under the "immunity bath" provisions of the Code38 which
attempts to bar all possible penalties which a state might impose as a
result of the testimony given and makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to
testify as to all matters "pertinent to the matter under inquiry." Upon
31. OMO REv. CODE § 3773.24.
32. See Survey of Ohio Law-1957, 9 WEST. REs. L REv. (1958).
33. State v. Kidd, 167 Ohio St. 521, 150 N.E.2d 413 (1958), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 358 U.S. 131 (1958).
34. 149 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio C. P. 1958). Specifically the film exhibited advocated
the practice of "nudism" which is prohibited by OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.31, as a
misdemeanor.
35. Omio REv. CODE § 2905.342 (B).
36. 152 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio C. P. 1958).
37. State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956).
38. OHIO REy. CODE § 2917.42.
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appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, that Court vacated
the Ohio judgments and remanded the causes "for consideration' in the
light of the Sweezy 9 and Watkins4° cases. In 1958 the Supreme Court
of Ohio reconsidered its decisions, concluded that the named cases did
not materially affect its decision and adhered to its former judgment.4 1
The final chapter in this litigation has not been written since an appeal
has been taken from the reinstated judgments. A decision may -be ex-
pected during the 1958 Term of the United States Supreme Court.
4 2
Municipal Legislation
The appellate courts considered the validity of municipal legislation
in two subject matter areas. Two courts of appeals' decisions upheld the
validity of ordinances which prescribed punishment as a misdemeanor for
ownership 4 3 or possession4 4 of pinball machines. The respective trial
courts, for different reasons, agreed on issuing injunctions against the en-
forcement of the ordinances. One of these cases was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Ohio.45 It sustained the validity of the ordinance,
holding that it could not be considered invalid merely because it prohibits
rather than regulates. Enacted within the police power, the prohibition
against coin operated pin games may stand even though the only induce-
ment offered to a player is the amusement arising from the play.
Concealed Weapons
An arrest and conviction for carrying concealed weapon in violation
of an ordinance of the City of Cleveland resulted in a decision which
dearly delimits the authority of municipal legislative bodies to define
39. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), concerned principally with
the matter of pertinency in state investigations.
40. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), dealing with some aspects of
pertinency in questions asked by congressional investigating committee.
41. State v. Morgan, 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N.E.2d 847 (1958).
42. Morgan v. State of Ohio, - U. S. -, 79 S. Ct. 99 (1958), transferring the
case to the appellate docket and setting it for argument.
43. Feak v. City of Toledo, 104 Ohio App. 304, 148 N.E.2d 703 (1957), appeal
dismissed for want of a debatable constitutional question, 167 Ohio St. 167 (1957),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1958). The court of appeals asserted that it was not
deciding any constitutional issue because it had not been presented, merely reversed
the trial court on its factual determination and rendered final judgment for the city.
44. The issue of constitutionality was directly raised in Benjamin v. City of Co-
lumbus, 104 Ohio App. 295, 148 N.E.2d 695 (1957), aff'd, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146
N.E.2d 854 (1957), cert. denied 357 U.S. 904 (1958).
45. Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E2d 854 (1957).
Since the City of Columbus seems to have had the more severe ordinance, this deci-
sion appears controlling also on the validity of the "ownership" type of ordinance
involved in the City of Toledo case.
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punishment for violations of local police "regulations." A Supreme
Court decision46 has stated that the "test is whether the ordinance permits
or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits and vice versa."
A City of Cleveland ordinance had made the carrying of concealed weap-
ons a misdemeanor, whereas a state statute prescribed the same offense as
a felony. The court of appeals,47 with the Supreme Court affirming,48
however, held that a municipal ordinance which makes the carrying of
concealed weapons a misdemeanor is in conflict with a general statutory
enactment making the identical offense a felony and is therefore invalid.
This position is based upon a construction of the Ohio Constitution49
which authorizes municipalities to adopt and enforce within their limits
only such local police regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws.
In the future a municipality must in prescribing a penalty for viola-
tion of ordinance which prohibits in the identical manner of an exist-
ing state statute impose the same penalty that the state law imposes.
In practical effect this excludes from the municipal regulations field, the
imposition of penalties for identical offenses which are felonies under
state law.
Arrest
The defendant was prosecuted for driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Under the Ohio Code5" an
arrest may not be made on Sunday except on a charge of treason, felony,
or breach of the peace. The defendant was arrested on Sunday and went
on trial the following Monday; the proper affidavit was prepared and
warrant was issued on Monday. Defendant responded to this warrant
and entered a plea of not guilty. The court of appeals held that the
Monday affidavit and warrant cured the infirmity, if any, resulting from
the Sunday arrest.51
Another court of appeals decision clearly defines the authority of a
police officer to arrest without a warrant in misdemeanor cases. A city
policeman in Columbus was called to a residential address. Although
there was no breach of peace of any kind in progress, there was an
46. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
47. City of Cleveland v. Betts 148 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
48. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1959). This
case is discussed here because it concludes the litigation and the decision is too im-
portant to hold until the next annual survey issue.
49. Art. XVIII, § 3.
50. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2331.12, 2331.13.
51. City of Piqua v. Collett, 151 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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active dispute over ownership of an automobile. Upon examination of
the papers concerning the car, the officer ordered the defendant to hand
over the papers under threat of arrest for disorderly conduct. Defendant
refused, and she was then forcibly arrested and charged with resisting an
officer. Her conviction, however, was reversed.5 2 Since no misdemeanor
was in progress when the officer arrived, he could not arrest without a
warrant. Further, when the officer undertook to settle the disputed
claim, the defendant could forcibly resist attempts to make her comply
and this display of force could not 'be used as a basis for charging her
with resisting an officer.53  The accused had been charged under an
affidavit with first degree murder, and upon his formal written demand
he had been granted a preliminary hearing before a municipal judge who
then ordered him held for the grand jury. Thereupon accused demanded
another hearing in common pleas court. The common pleas court also
ordered him recommitted to custody. An appeal from the common pleas
decision however, was dismissed 'by the court of appeals.&" While the
language of the statute seems clear,5 5 as indicated in the court's opinion,
the provision for the preliminary examination is applicable only before
indictment, and an appeal from the adverse decision of an examining
court becomes moot after an indictment has been returned.
An interesting construction of the Ohio extradition statute56 arose
from a habeas corpus hearing. The requistion of the demanding governor
did not state in the words of the Ohio statute that the accused was present
in -the demanding state at the time of commission of an alleged crime.
It did, however, recite that the accused had been charged with breaking
and entering committed in the demanding state. A mandatory habeas
corpus hearing57 was granted the accused, and the court discharged him
because of lack of authority of the governor to issue the warrant for his
extradition.58
52. City of Columbus v. Holmes, 152 N.E.2d 301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
53. The court stated that a mere suspicion or belief that a misdemeanor has been
committed will not authorize an arrest without a warrant citing OHIo REv. CODE
§ 4505.04 et seq, as being a part of the Ohio Code of Criminal Procedure, incorpo-
rating into Ohio law the general rule throughout the country. This is undoubtedly
a typographic error since the code sections cited are not in the Criminal Code but
rather refer to certificates of title for motor vehides. Earlier in its opinion the court
correctly refers to § 2935.03, as applying to an officer arresting without a warrant,
and it is this section which incorporates into Ohio law the general nile throughout
the country.
54. Howell v. Keiter, 104 Ohio App. 28, 146 N.E.2d 452 (1957).
55. OHiO REV. CODE § 2937.34. One of the early clauses in this section reads:
"charged with an offense for which he has not been indicted..
56. Oiso REv. CODE § 2963.03.
57. Omo REv. CODE § 2963.09.
58. In re McMeans, 146 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ohio C. P. 1957). The attitude of the
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The demanding governor's requisition complied with the federal stat-
ute on extradition which only requires that a copy of the charge against
the person who has fled the demanding state be authenticated by the
governor of the state from whence the accused has fled.59 In the principal
case the requisition appears to have been in the usual form, and in a
similar situation the Supreme Court of the United States declared that it
was the duty of the governor of the asylum state to issue his warrant
when confronted with authenticated copies of the charges (indictment
in this case) against the accused.60
The action of the trial court in the principal case also seems con-
trary to an 1878 decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.61 In this early
case the court indicated that any conflict between a federal statute and
an Ohio statute must be resolved in favor of the former. Further, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the requisition, the opinion states: 'We
are not to be governed by the rules of construction applicable to special
pleading, but the rules applicable to the construction of statutes . . ." A
later court of appeals opinion indicated that extradition documents which
depart from Ohio statutory requirements but comply with the federal
statute are adequate.62  Under a similar statutory provision in Massa-
chusetts substantial compliance is sufficient to justify issuance of the gov-
ernor's warrant.
63
The attitude of the court is conveyed by the following quotation from
the opinion:
This Court feels that the requirements of Section 2963.03 of the Re-
vised Code of Ohio are mandatory and unless there is a compliance with
the provisions of Section 2963.03 that the Governor of Ohio has no au-
thority in law to recognize a demand from another state for the extradition
of a person charged with crime in such other state unless the demand from
such other state meets the mandatory requirements of 2963.03 of the Re-
vised Code of Ohio.
There is not a hint in the report of this case that a federal statute is
paramount.
court is conveyed by the following quotation from the opinion: "This Court feels
that the requirements of [§ 2963.03 OHIo REv. CODE] are mandatory and unless
there is a compliance with the provisions of S 2963.03 that the Governor of Ohio
has no authority in law to recognize a demand from another state for the extradition
of a person charged with crime in such other state unless the demand from such
other state meets the mandatory requirements of [§ 2963.03 OHIo REV. CODE)."
59. 62 Star. § 822 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1952).
60. Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63, 67 (1909).
There is not a hint in the report of this case that a federal statute is paramount.
61. Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319, 323 (1878).
62. In re Sanders, 31 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).
63. In re Baker, 310 Mass. 724, 39 N.E.2d 762 (1942). The Massachusetts
statute said: "shall allege that the person demanded was present in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime . ... "
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A court of appeals decision applied the long established rule in
Ohio0 4 that venue in a criminal case may be established by all the facts
and circumstances of a case without necessity for proof in express termsY5
Another decision66 applied the rule that a statement of criminal charge
in the words of the section of the Revised Code describing the offense is
sufficient.67  A paragraph in the syllabus emphasized that this ruling
was to be expected where the defendant failed to request a bill of particu-
lars.
Giordano v. State"s considers the question whether an indictment
charging a person with being an habitual criminal must charge that the
prior felony convictions resulted in imprisonment. Despite judicial au-
thority69 holding under a former version of this statute" that imprison-
ment must be alleged, the present statute requires only that convictions
be alleged.l
Pleas
A habeas corpus proceeding raised the question whether the accused's
attorney may in his presence change the plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."
Counsel made the request for change of pleas in the midst of trial, it was
accepted by the court and accused was sentenced. At no time did accused
personally plead guilty nor did the court ask the accused whether the
statement of the attorney was his personal -plea. There appears to be
no statutory answer to this question in Ohio, and the court of appeals
decided that the greater weight of authority holds that a plea of guilty
when entered by counsel has the same force and effect as a plea per-
sonally entered by the accused when the latter is present in court and
64. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907).
65. State v. Neff, 104 Ohio App. 289, 148 N.E.2d 236 (1957).
66. State v. Parks, 105 Ohio App. 208, 152 N.E.2d 154 (1957). While the
prosecution's statement was contained in an affidavit charging the offense of acting
in a way tending to cause the delinquence of a minor, the OHIO REv. CODB §
2941.35 renders the specific statutes applicable to indictments or information also
applicable to affidavits.
67. OHIO R v. CODE § 2941.05.
68. 148 N.E.2d 56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
69. Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N.E. 18 (1893). The statute under
consideration in this case (82 Ohio Laws 237) required "imprisoned in some penal
institution for felony."
70. The report of the case is not dear on the exact nature of the sentence, though
it appears that he was sentenced under what is now OHIO REv. CODE § 2961.11.
71. The allegation of three listed felony convictions indicated an objective of the
prosecutor to bring defendant's fourth felony conviction within the scope of §
2961.12 which carries mandatory life imprisonment. The principal case was a
habeas corpus proceeding and the decision was that accused was not being unlaw-
fully detained in the Ohio penitentiary.
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when from the circumstances it appears that the accused understood what
was being done and acquiesced in the charge."2
An interesting court of appeals decision73 considered the effect of a
plea of double jeopardy by a person who had pleaded not guilty to an
unsigned affidavit charging him with driving an automobile while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. He had had a partial hearing prior
to the filing of a proper affidavit to which a plea of not guilty was
again filed. During the second trial the municipal judge suddenly
granted a motion to quash on the ground that the arrest was illegal and
discharged the accused. The prosecutor appealed on questions of law.
The court of appeals found that the initial proceeding without proper
affidavit was a nullity and therefore did not put accused in jeopardy and
that the prosecution did not commence until the filing of a proper affi-
davit by the police officer. Thus, the motion to quash was improperly
granted and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for
further proceedings.7 4
An accused who had been tried for murder while perpetrating a rob-
bery and been acquitted was later tried on an indictment charging armed
robbery growing out of the same transaction or situation. He was found
guilty on this indictment but obtained a new trial. Upon the new
trial the accused sought to file a plea of res judicata. The accused in-
sisted that the only issue for the jury in the robbery trial was the same
issue which was presented to the jury in the murder trial - alibi. The
majority opinion in overruling the plea of res judicata asserted that its
decision was controlled by a leading double jeopardy decision in Ohio,7 5
and denied that the doctrine of res judicata had any application.76 The
minority opinion points out that alibi was the sole defense in both cases,
and therefore that the decision in the murder case was res judicata to the
single issue of fact in dispute in the robbery case. The widely differing
points of view expressed in the court's opinions, coupled with a lack
of authoritative Ohio77 judicial decisions on the point, raises a question
72. In re Morelli, 148 N.E.2d 96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
73. State v. Zdovc, 106 Ohio App. 481, 151 N.E.2d 672 (1958).
74. The court of appeals stated that the motion to quash was granted because the
trial court was of the opinion it did not have jurisdiction because of an unauthorized
arrest. The court does not decide the arrest issue because it holds that the jurisdiction
of the court is predicated upon a proper charge and the presence of the accused in
the court. Whether the arrest was proper or not was therefore immaterial. A second
point was made that the plea of not guilty waived all defects which might be ex-
pected by a motion to quash. See OHIO REv. CODE § 2941.59.
75. Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E.90 (1924).
76. State v. Orth, Ohio App. 35, 153 N.E.2d 395 (1957).
77. See concurring opinion in State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776
(1951).
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of whether the defense of res judicata has any established place in Ohio
criminal procedure.
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution contains an express
guaranty of "a speedy public trial ... in the county in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed." Under the caption of "acquittal
without trial," the statutes7 8 provide for the discharge of persons held too
long in jail or under bail after being formally charged with an offense. A
discharge for "unreasonable delay" in bringing the accused to trial is a
statutory bar79 to further prosecution for the same offense. The statutory
provisions however, do not apply to a person who is being held in the
Ohio penitentiary for another crime. Two cases involved attempted
prosecutions of persons charged with criminal offenses prior to and all
during their incarceration in the Ohio penitentiary after their release and
return to the county of the alleged offenses under "detainers." These
cases illustrate the vitality of the constitutional requirement of a speedy
trial. The periods of imprisonment during which -the affidavits had -been
outstanding were nine years and one month, and twenty-eight months
respectively. When the defendants were brought to trial, defense coun-
sel moved to dismiss the indictments for denial of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial. The motions were granted.80  The court pointed out
that incarceration in a penal institution is not a satisfactory excuse for
delay in prosecution of outstanding criminal charges. Recognizing that
the statutes governing dismissals are inapplicable to persons confined in
the penitentiary under prior convictions, the court took notice of the
time fixed by the legislature in these statutes in determining whether the
constitutional provision had -been violated. Since the time in each case
exceeded the maximum permitted by the statutes, it concluded that both
accused had been denied a speedy trial.
Another significant point in the court's opinion is the rejection of
the state's argument that the constitutional right is waived if the defend-
ant has knowledge of a criminal charge and fails to demand a speedy
trial."' The court concluded that there is no obligation on the accused to
demand a speedy trial. It is the duty of the state to provide such trial,
consistent with the rights of the defendant.82
78. Omo REv. CODE §§ 2945.71, 2945.72.
79. OHio REv. CODE § 2945.73.
80. State v. Milner, 149 N.B.2d 189 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
81. Such an argument could not be applicable to the facts of these cases because
the police merely filed affidavits with the court and failed to prosecute the criminal
actions to a point at which accused could have demanded a trial.
82. In the leading case of Shafer v. State, 43 Ohio App. 493, 183 N.E. 774 (1932),
the court indicated that it is the duty of the state to provide for a speedy trial and
there is no obligation on the accused to demand it. Accused had been indicted three
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The Ohio statute83 directs the trial judge to question the jury under
oath or affirmation on the voire dire. In a recent case the judge appar-
ently asked no questions though he required the jury to be sworn, per-
mitted questions by the prosecution, and solicited questions from defense
counsel. The latter stated that he had none but made a point of reserving
all of his client's constitutional and statutory rights in the impaneling of
the jury. The court of appeals determined8 4 that the failure or error in
not asking questions of the jury in the principal case was one of omission
and not prejudicial. It was the duty of defendant or his counsel to call
the court's attention specifically to the nature of his objections. His gen-
eral reservation of constitutional and statutory rights of the defendant was
considered insufficient to take advantage of the court's error of omission.
Three cases dealt with the alleged improper conduct of the prosecu-
tion during the course of trials. In the first case,8 5 .the prejudicial conduct
charged was the prosecutor's having the decedent's wife present at the trial
table during the murder trial of the accused. There was no showing that
the selection of the wife to sit at the state's table was in bad faith; there
was no irregularity arising from her presence there. Another point
brought out in this trial was the activities of a stranger who had tried to
observe the jury in its deliberation and had also conferred with the de-
fense counsel. The matter came to the attention of the trial judge who
took steps to prevent a recurrence of the stranger's activities. The court
of appeals held that neither of the foregoing incidents prevented the
accused from having a fair trial.
The second case8 6 concerned the prosecutor's conduct during the direct
examination of a witness in a robbery prosecution. The witness had
apparently failed to pick the defendant out in the court room, and the
prosecutor asked the witness to look at a specific table. This was not mis-
conduct though a leading question, when prosecutor stated that the wit-
times, and all three cases were set for trial in 1930; accused pleaded guilty to one of
the charges and was sentenced and incarcerated in the penitentiary. Eighteen months
later accused moved to dismiss the other two indictments, and there was no request
that they be set for trial. The court of common pleas heard the applications and
overruled them without prejudice to defendant's right to request a date for trial.
On appeal the court of appeals determined that the judgment of the trial court
that a delay of 18 months was not a denial of a speedy trial was not manifestly
wrong. It indicated however, that further delay after attention directed to the mat-
ter would constitute a denial of constitutional rights.
83. OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.27. The 1957 amendment to the section required
the administration of the oath or affirmation to the jury prior to the voire dire
questioning.
84. City of Columbus v. Vurris, 151 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
85. State v. Bryant, 105 Ohio App. 452, 152 N.E.2d 678 (1957).
86. State v. Waters, 105 Ohio App. 397, 152 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
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ness had looked either once or twice -before at the accused without recog-
nizing him. The defense then attempted unsuccessfully to impeach the
verdict by requesting subpoena of the entire jury to testify on the mat-
ter of the identification of the accused.
The third case8 7 involved the right of the prosecution to comment on
the failure of an adult to testify, the adult being prosecuted for acting in
a way tending to cause the delinquency of a minor. Such a prosecution
of the adult is a criminal proceeding and the accused may not be com-
pelled to give testimony which will either incriminate or tend to in-
criminate him. This failure may be commented on by the prosecutor
and taken into consideration along with all the other facts and circum-
stances in evidence in determining the accused's guilt or innocence.
Another case88 determined that comment of the trial judge about the
court's decisions in cases in which an accused has submitted to alcohol
tests and the tests have shown a content below that making a person
under the influence of alcohol was prejudicial under the circumstances.
The accused had refused to take such test and the court had instructed
the jury that he had a constitutional right to refuse. The court of appeals
felt that the language used might well have been interpreted by .the jury
as a suggestion or an opinion by the trial courts as to the guilt or -inno-
cence of the accused.
Evidence
A number of appellate cases presented a cross-section of special prob-
lems in criminal evidence. Defendant was charged with selling liquor
to an intoxicated person. It was held proper 9 to admit in evidence
the plea of guilty 'to a charge of -intoxication by the person to whom
the accused was alleged to have sold the intoxicating liquor.
In one case judicial notice of geographic facts assisted the -prosecution
in establishing venue.90 In another case -the introduction of evidence of
a bottle sold 'by the defendant was allowed without proof of its contents
where it was labelled as gin, sealed with a federal revenue stamp and was
imprinted by the Ohio State Department of Liquor.9 '
A defendant who seeks to claim an alibi is required -by statute to
serve written notice of such proposal on the prosecutor. This require-
ment continues as a mandatory one. 2
87. State v. Parks, 105 Ohio App. 208, 152 N.E.2d 454 (1958).
88. City of Columbus v. Mothersbaugh, 104 Ohio App. 147 N.E.2d 132 (1957).
89. State v. Morello, 154 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
90. State v. Neff, 104 Ohio App. 289, 148 N.E.2d 236 (1957).
"91. City of Dayton v. Winton, 105 Ohio App. 510, 147 N.E.2d 510 (1947).
92. State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 149 N.E.2d 583 (1957).
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The problem of sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of crime to
render admissible confessions or admissions alleged to have been made
by the defendant is a continuing one. In prosecutions for failing to stop
after a motor vehicle accident9" and also for bribery,9 4 evidence of the
accused's statements were properly admitted when state witnesses narrated
facts and statements which indicated the crimes charged had been com-
mitted. In the latter case the trial court correctly admitted "verbal facts"
of police officers as both evidence of the corpus delicti and as state-
ments against the defendant's interest.
Another case illustrates the rule that a defendant in a criminal case
who claims to be within the exception to a rule prohibiting an act must
offer testimony that he comes within the exception 5 to secure the con-
sideration of the exception as to him.
Another interesting case grew out of an effort to convict an accused
charged with practicing optometry without a license. It appeared that
the accused had been properly licensed at one time, and there was some
very confusing evidence about his license having been revoked. Because
of the criminal law rule that the fact of revocation must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence continued and
a judgment of conviction was accordingly reversed. 96
Instructions
The Ohio Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court, in
charging the jury, to state the meaning of the presumption of innocence,
and read the statutory definition of reasonable doubt.9 7 While it is per-
missible for the court to further explain the meaning of reasonable doubt,
the additional explanation must be consistent with the statute. Indulgency
in such descriptive terms as "strong probabilities of guilty" is not consis-
tent with the statute and is reversible error.9 8
The Ohio Code of Criminal Procedure99 also refers to proof of de-
fendant's motive when that matter is material. A Supreme Court decision
neatly draws the line on the necessity of instructions on motive in homi-
cide. Where there is direct evidence of a deliberate killing without
provocation, and the determination of guilt or innocence dependent upon
the credibility of witnesses to the act of killing, the trial court is not re-
93. City of Columbus v. Glover, 154 N.E.2d 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
94. State v. Moore, 150 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
95. State v. Casper, 106 Ohio App. 176, 154 N.E.2d 9 (1958).
96. State v. Barhorst, 106 Ohio App. 335, 153 N.E.2d 514 (1958).
97. Oino REv. CODB 5 2945.04.
98. State v. Stubbs, 153 N.E.2d 214 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
99. OHIo R.V. CODE § 2945.59.
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quired to charge on the question of motive. If, on the other hand, in a
homicide case, the evidence is purely circumstantial and there is no direct
identification of the killer, evidence of motive is very important, and
when such evidence is offered, it is the duty of the trial court to instruct
the jury that it should take the evidence on that question into considera-
tion together with all the other evidence and circumstances, in determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused.' 00
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial judge to inform
the jury that it is the exclusive judge of all questions of fact,'0 and it
is an axiomatic rule that a judge cannot make a comment upon the evi-
dence in the giving of written instructions. However, this does not
forbid the trial judge from advising the jury in an instruction that the
statements by the accused have established a fact as a matter of law. This
is illustrated by a prosecution for possession and sale of narcotics. The
first count of the indictment charged unlawful possession, and the de-
fendant denied possession but admitted sufficient facts to establish his
possession as a matter of law. It was proper under these circumstances
for the court to instruct the jury that the defendant admitted doing the
acts set forth in the indictment.1
0 2
In a felony prosecution the trial court gave an instruction that the
defense of alibi should not be considered unless it is established by a
preponderance of the evidence, though overall the burden of proof was
still on the state if the alibi defense was not proved. This was not en-
tirely consistent with rule in Ohio, that the evidence of alibi may be con-
sidered when properly presented by the defense 0 3 It appeared from the
record, however, that no statutory notice of alibi had been -filed and also
that the record was totally devoid of any evidence - not even a scintilla
- of alibi during the time of the alleged offense. Under these circum-
stances, the charge need not have been given at all, and it could not, as
given, prejudice the defendant, though erroneous, because there was no
evidence before the jury on the subject of alibi.10 4
State v. Taylor'0 5 applies the Ohio rule that it is the duty of defense
counsel to call to the coures attention any errors of omission and if this
is not done, the omission may not form the basis of error proceedings.
In a prosecution for second degree murder, the court did charge on the
100. State v. Lancaster, 167 Ohio St. 391, 149 N.E.2d 157 (1958).
101. OHIo REv. CODE § 2945.11.
102. State v. Lightfoot, 149 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
103. Walters v. State, 39 Ohio St. 215 (1883). The court indicated that a trial
court's charge on alibi should conform to the holding in this leading case.
104. State v. Payne, 104 Ohio App. 410, 149 N.E.2d 583 (1957). The statutory
notice to which the court refers is set out in OHio REv. CODE § 2945.58.
105. State v. Taylor, 104 Ohio App. 422, 148 N.E.2d 507 (1957).
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"reasonable man theory" but failed to fally develop the distinctions be-
tween voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. There was a conviction
of manslaughter. The court of appeals held that a general exception did
not reach this error of omission.'0 6
Probation, Sentence and Parole
The Ohio Code'1 7 provides that the judge or magistrate shall immedi-
ately inquire into the conduct of the defendant prior to terminating a
probation and imposing sentence. The Supreme Court of Ohio deter-
mined that this does not mean a "judicial inquiry," either a formal trial
or even any notice of a hearing on termination of probation, other
than that given to the defendant by his arrest as a suspected probation
violator. This inquiry may be summary and informal so long as it is an
inquiry which shows a sufficient range of investigation and sufficient
consideration of evidence of violation of the terms of probation to indi-
cate an exercise of sound judicial discretion.10 8  In this much litigated
case, the defendant had been convicted of felonious assault, fined and
placed on probation for three years on condition that he not violate any
laws of the state during that period.' 0 9
In another probation revocation case the trial court acted favorably
upon the prosecutor's motion which charged the defendant with con-
tempt of court, perjury in a criminal case, and violation of the express
terms of the probation by going from the county without the express
consent of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court revoking the probation. 10  Its per curiam opinion relied ex-
clusively on the Theisen case, discussed above, in which the court an-
nounced the doctrine that revocation of probation is within the sound
judicial discretion of the trial court.
Sentence
The defendant had been charged with kidnapping, an offense for
which the maximum penalty is death, but the victim had -been liberated
unharmed, and the defendant had pleaded guilty. The trial judge gave
106. The court indicates that the failure to fully charge on manslaughter was per-
haps prejudicial to the state but not to the accused because of the entry of the general
exception only.
107. OHIo REa. CODE § 2951.09.
108. State v. Theisen, 167 Ohio St. 119, 146 N.E.2d 865 (1957).
109. This case was previously before the Supreme Court on the trial judge's au-
thority to impose a fine, suspend imprisonment and grant probation. State v. Thei-
sen, 165 Ohio St. 313, 135 N.E.2d 392 (1956).
110. State v. Luera, 167 Ohio St. 125, 146 N.E.2d 870 (1957).
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him the minimum sentence. After imprisonment the defendant sought
release by writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction to impose sentence because there was no written waiver of
jury trial and furthermore that the sentence was void because not im-
posed by a three judge court. On both points, the court of appeals held
against the petitioner. The plea of guilty removed any question of the
right to jury trial, and on .the sentence, since the trial judge gave the
accused the most lenient punishment possible, there was no deprivation
of constitutional or legal rights."1
In another habeas corpus proceeding the petitioner contended that
the sentence was void because the trial judge had sentenced him for one
year for a narcotic violation wherein the penalty was either a felony or
misdemeanor. The court applied" 2 the "saving' statute'" to this sen-
tence, determined that the judge intended to sentence for a felony, and
construed the term as general as provided by the statute.
A defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge of sodomy. The trial
judge acting under the statute 1 4 concerning mentally deficient offenders,
found him to be a mentally deficient person, and ordered him committed
to Lima State Hospital. A writ of habeas corpus was denied" 5 in the
court of appeals, that court being of the opinion that the trial judge had
jurisdiction to sentence; that the matters raised by petitioner could be
appropriately raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed" 6 on the
ground that the matters raised could have -been determined on appeal
and that the writ cannot be a substitute for the appeal.
Two cases deal with the jurisdiction of a trial judge to suspend the
license of a motor vehicle operator under the Driver's License Law." 7
An operator questioned the authority of the trial judge to suspend his
general driving license for fifteen months and to permit him to drive
within the scope of his employment only. This was more liberal than
the judge needed -to be, and the operator had not been -prejudiced by
this lenient order. The judgment was affirmed"18 on statutory authority
111. State ex rel. Novack v. Eckle, 148 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
112. State ex rel. Nawson v. Eckle, 148 N.E.2d 260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
113. OHio REv. CODE § 5145.01, providing that a sentence to the penitentiary for
a definite term is not void but shall be considered as a minimum-maximum for the
particular felony.
114. OmIo REV. CODE § 2947.25.
115. In re Latham, 153 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
116. In re Latham, 168 Ohio St. 14, 150 N.E.2d 857 (1958), relying upon the de-
dsion of In re Harley, 165 Ohio St. 48, 146 N.E.2d 121 (1957), in which the writes
unavailability because of the right to appeal was discussed.
117. Oaio REV. CODE § 4507.16.
118. State v. Sparks, 151 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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-for misdemeanors1"9 and the inherent power of a court to suspend and
sentence and impose conditions.
The second case decided 20 that the statutory authority to suspend a
driver's license for failing to stop and identify oneself at the scene of the
accident applied to a trial judge sentencing for a conviction under a city
"hitskip" ordinance. The statute uses the clause "when required by law
to do so." The court holds that the word "law" in this statute' 2 1 includes
municipal ordinances.
An error was made on the notice of final release on parole indicating
that the release applied to a sentence for which the term had not yet
expired. This error was indicated by the fact that the correct offense to
which the parole related appears on the official minutes of the Pardon
and Parole Commission. The defendant's petition for release was denied
because the official minutes of the Commission control over the certifi-
cate of release issued to the defendant. 22
Criminal Appeals
A court of appeals decision emphasized the additional statutory re-
quirement for appeals from juvenile court decisions convicting adults.
The Juvenile Court Act12a does not provide an appeal as a matter of
right similar to appeals from criminal judgments of common pleas courts.
Appeals may not be .taken to the court of appeals except for good cause
shown upon the filing of a motion for leave to appeal and notice to the
prosecuting attorney. There are two ways of getting into the court of
appeals: allowance of the motion by the court; the showing of good
cause preliminarily to appealing. This reason, among others, was a basis
for affirming a judgment of a juvenile court.124
Defendants filed appeals from orders of the trial court overruling a
plea in abatement in a criminal case. The appeals were dismissed be-
cause the orders were not appealable.12 5  The section of the Code for
Criminal Procedure 126 which provides for a review of "judgment or final
order" in a criminal case contemplates a final order as defined in the
119. OHIo REV. CODE § 2947.13.
120. City of Columbus v. Beery, 104 Ohio App. 344, 149 N.E.2d 22 (1957).
121. OHIo REV. CODE § 4507.16(E).
122. Trusley v. Eckle, 149 N.E.2d 575 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). The court pointed
out that the release could not have applied to the case indicated on the notice be-
cause the sentence had not expired on that offense and there was no jurisdiction to
grant a final release.
123. OHio REV. CODE § 2151.52.
124. State v. Parks, 105 Ohio App. 208, 152 N.E.2d 154 (1957).
125. State v. Roberts, 106 Ohio App. 30, 153 N.E.2d 203 (1957).
126. OHIo REv. CODE § 2953.02.
Uune
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Revised Code.' 27 This definition states that the final order must affect
a substantial right which in effect determines the action, and prevents a
judgment in favor of the party seeking relief. The overruling of a plea
in abatement does neither, nor does the overruling of a motion to dis-
miss. Orders overruling an accused's demurrer to an affidavit and over-
ruling a motion to dismiss the affidavit are not final orders from which
appeals may be taken.128
The problem of properly perfecting a criminal appeal keeps recurring.
The statute 29 states that appeals are instituted by filing a notice of appeal
with the court rendering the judgment or order and with a copy in the
appellate court where leave must be obtained. A defendant had filed
notice with the common pleas court from which he was appealing but
did not file a copy of the notice in the court of appeals. The notice was
filed with the trial court within six days of judgment. No notice was
required to the court of appeals' 30  This filing is only necessary when
leave to appeal to the court of appeals must be obtained, i.e., when the
notice is filed with the trial court more than thirty days after sentence
and judgment.' 3 '
The Code132 requires that the brief of the appellant shall be filed with
the transcript and shall contain the assignment of error relied on in the
appeal. This is a directory provision and it is considered good practice
to entertain requests for extensions of time. However, the failure to file
the brief without any showing of good cause or excuse and without any
request for additional time or for the court to fix a time for filing justi-
fies a dismissal of the appeal for failure to file assignment of error and
briefs in time.133  An example of a proper waiver of time required for
filing an assignment of error, bill of exceptions, and brief, occurred when
there was an inadvertent delay by court officials in docketing an appeal
in the court of appeals after a timely notice of appeal and a precipe for
a transcript of docket and journal entries had been filed in the trial
courrJ3
4
The original petitions of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court
illustrate the impossibility of using the writ as a substitute for or as a
127. OHIo REv. CODE § 2505.02. The court indicated that this definition is ap-
plicable in both civil and criminal cases.
128. State v. Holbrook, 152 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
129. OHIo REV. CODE § 2953.04.
130. City of Columbus v. Turner, 167 Ohio St. 541, 150 N.E.2d 412 (1958).
131. OHIo REv. CODE § 2953.05.
132. OHio REv. CODE § 2953.04.
133. State v. Waymire, 105 Ohio App. 177, 152 N.E.2d 686 (1957).
134. State v. Payne, 149 N.E.2d 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). The court overruled
a motion to dismiss the appeal and permitted late filing.
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